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657-2505

October 7, 1994

Mr. William F. Caton
Acting Secretary
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20554

DOCKET FILE COPY ORIGINAL

Re: Ex Parte Letter
PP Docket No. 93-253

Dear Mr. Caton:

Comcast Corporation ("Comcast"), by its attorneys, hereby requests that the Federal Communications Commission (the "Commission") revise or clarify its current anti-collusion rule to permit a consortium member or members to continue bidding on a specific license after all other associated consortium members withdraw from the bidding process as to such license.

The current anti-collusion rules force bidders to elect at the short-term application stage either an individual or joint consortia filing strategy. As a result, the Commission may be foreclosing bidders from availing themselves of bidding options that are otherwise not at odds with the Commission's anti-collusion rules and will advance other stated Commission goals. As described below, modifying the anti-collusion rule to permit consortia to "fold" in a particular market but permit a former consortia member to continue bidding: (1) will offer bidders greater flexibility to alter their bidding strategies during the course of the auction; (2) will not facilitate collusive or otherwise anti-competitive behavior; (3) will place licenses in the hands of parties that value the spectrum the most; and (4) will maximize the revenues realized from allocating valuable radio spectrum through competitive bidding.

On reconsideration of its generic auction rules, the Commission revised its general anti-collusion prohibition to permit bidders who have not filed short form applications for any of the same licenses to engage in discussions and enter into

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bidding consortia or joint bidding arrangements during the course of the auction.^{2/} The Commission determined that the initial prohibition against communications and arrangements among all bidders, after the short form applications are filed, was excessively broad because it would prevent useful arrangements among bidders that would have no effect on the competitiveness of bidding.^{3/}

The Commission, however, has not addressed a circumstance in which a consortium may find that it is outbid for, or otherwise no longer desires to pursue, a particular market, while a particular member of that consortium may believe that the particular license is not over-valued in the auction. Under the current rules, if a resulting change in consortium ownership would be a change in "control" of the applicant, it would not be permitted. In this instance, however, there does not appear to be a logical distinction between allowing minor changes but disallowing major changes in ownership.

For example, if a consortium consists of ten members with equal interests that have been properly identified on the PCS applicant's short form application, circumstances may arise where one member of the consortium wishes to continue bidding on a specific PCS license while the remaining members no longer wish to participate because they do not collectively value the license to the level to which it has been bid. The Commission's rules should provide that individual consortium members may continue to bid for the license, even if the withdrawal of one or more consortium members effectively transfers control of the consortium's application for that market, so long as the consortium ownership change notification is filed as provided in the rules. Alternatively, the Commission could permit both major and minor ownership changes to occur during the course of the auction process and utilize the required long form process as a means to allow the identification of the remaining members of a consortium in a particular market.

2/ See Second Memorandum and Order, Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act - Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253, FCC 94-215 (adopted August 15, 1994, released August 15, 1994) at ¶ 51.

3/ The collusion rules also have been relaxed to permit modifications to an applicant's ownership during the course of the auction so long as no change of control of any PCS applicant takes place. See Second Memorandum and Order at 51.

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Since the parties in a consortium are required to be identified in the short-form application, the public will have been fully apprised of the identity of the remaining bidders. Further, the public remains apprised of the make-up of each bidder as a result of the consortium's continuing notification responsibilities. This situation differs significantly from that governed by the Commission's rules regarding the addition of new members when a transfer of control occurs. When a new (s.g. post-short form filing) entity joins a consortium and assumes control, other bidders are not apprised of the bidder's true ownership and participation status prior to the commencement of the PCS auctions.^{4/}

In addition, this recommendation is consistent with the Commission's desire to adopt flexible anti-collusion rules that prevent anti-competitive behavior and, at the same time, permit bidders the ability to react to the activities of other bidders during the auction process. As noted in both the Second Report and Order and the Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Commission's principal concern in establishing an anti-collusion rule was to prevent anti-competitive conduct and to prevent bidders from entering consortia in the eleventh hour, thereby frustrating the efforts of other bidders that value a particular license the most.^{5/} Allowing the remaining consortia member or members to continue bidding, however, increases the competitiveness of the auctions and holds no potential for anti-competitive behavior. In fact, accommodating the goals of the consortium's individual members if the consortium is unwilling to continue bidding in a particular market accomplishes the same objective served by the anti-collusion rule: to guarantee a

4/ Modifying the rule pursuant to Comcast's request would not only complete the Commission's treatment of consortium issues and add symmetry to the Commission's Rules, it would also constitute a logical outgrowth of the rulemaking's inquiry under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Small Reference Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

5/ See s.g. Second Report and Order 9 FCC Rcd 2348, 2386-2387 (1994) (indicating that anti-collusion rule prevents parties from agreeing in advance to bidding strategies that divide the market according to their strategic interests and thereby disadvantage other bidders).

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competitive bidding environment for the assignment of radio spectrum.^{6/}

Similarly, no issues regarding adequacy of disclosure or bidding eligibility are raised in that the parties involved in the consortium have already submitted specific information regarding their ownership, such that all parties participating in the auction are apprised of the interests of all consortium members and the licenses for which they will bid. In addition, the post-auction Petition to Deny phase of the auction process permits interested parties to examine, in detail, the activities of the consortium and any particular party that opts to participate in the PCS auctions once other members have withdrawn.^{7/}

Additionally, permitting consortium members to continue bidding after other consortium bidders have withdrawn from the group will result in licenses being assigned to those parties that value the radio spectrum the most. The Commission has expressed repeatedly a desire to establish rules that assign licenses to parties capable and willing to invest and build innovative PCS systems. Providing the flexibility Comcast requests serves to achieve this goal.^{8/}

6/ Withdrawing from a cooperative arrangement holds no opportunity for "collusion" because the parties involved are actually deciding not to cooperate in the PCS auctions in regard to specific markets.

7/ Adoption of Comcast's recommendation would not affect the winning bidders' obligation to submit a long-form application identifying those consortium members that continued to participate in the auction and successfully bid on a particular PCS license. Nor would modification of the Commission's anti-collusion rule permit parties ineligible to bid for certain PCS spectrum to circumvent the rules and bid based only on their association with the bidding consortium. Accordingly, cellular providers will still be limited to holding 10 MHz of spectrum in areas where they provide cellular service, providing that their population coverage exceeds the established eligibility threshold.

8/ There is no rational basis for requiring potential PCS applicants to choose between participating in the PCS auctions only as a member of a consortium or only as an individual for all available licenses, at the outset, because parties have no way to predict the auction values for individual markets.

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Finally, the public interest will be furthered by maximizing returns to the Treasury as the Commission encourages parties to bid on PCS licenses to the extent they are valued in the marketplace. Restraining the ability of consortium members to compete for spectrum only serves to repress the participation of eligible bidders in the PCS auctions, and leaves money on the table that otherwise would be used to acquire PCS licenses. Comcast's proposal adds an additional bidder to the process, increasing the likelihood of a higher winning bid and plainly advancing one of the auction objectives.

Accordingly, Comcast requests that the Commission modify its rules to permit consortium members to withdraw from a bidding consortia arrangement, and allow surviving members to continue bidding if they believe that their goals are better served by continued participation in the PCS auction for a particular license or group of licenses. Adoption of Comcast's recommendation, as discussed above: (1) will offer bidders greater flexibility to alter their bidding strategies during the course of the auction; (2) will not facilitate collusive or otherwise anti-competitive behavior; (3) will place licenses in the hands of parties that value the spectrum the most; and (4) will maximize the revenues realized from allocating valuable radio spectrum through competitive bidding.

Respectfully submitted,

COMCAST CORPORATION


Leonard J. Kennedy

Its Attorney

cc: Chairman Reed E. Hundt
Commissioner James H. Quello
Commissioner Andrew C. Barrett
Commissioner Rachelle B. Chong
Commissioner Susan Ness
Dr. Robert M. Pepper
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Dear Roz and Jackie:

Don Gips suggested that I provide the attached letters to you for your urgent consideration.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Len Kennedy